What Does 'One State, One Army' Mean in Syria? Türkiye's Border Security Doctrine, UN Charter Article 51 and the Homs Refinery Plot

Why It Matters

'One state, one army' is Türkiye's stated position that Syria should have a single legitimate state monopoly on force, with no parallel armed structures along Türkiye's roughly 1,300 km Syria–Iraq frontier. Ankara links this to Article 51 of the UN Charter and to Syrian territorial integrity; critics dispute how the doctrine is applied.

On 3 November 2026, Syria's Internal Security Forces, working with the General Intelligence Directorate, said they had foiled a 'terrorist plot' by a Hezbollah-linked cell against the Homs refinery. The episode is a useful lens on the doctrine: Ankara argues that armed actors outside state control threaten institutions and critical infrastructure. This guide separates what was reported, what Syrian officials said, and what Türkiye officially argues. Figures about the plot vary by outlet and are not independently verified.

Background

Türkiye's Syria policy took its present form after 2011, as the civil war opened space for PKK/KCK-PYD/YPG and DAESH along the border. Between 2016 and 2020 Türkiye ran four cross-border operations, citing Article 51 of the UN Charter, and after the Assad government fell on 8 December 2024 it began backing a unified Syrian state.

Why the border matters to Ankara

Turkish officials describe the Syria and Iraq frontiers as roughly 1,300 km of land border to be protected around the clock, a principle summarized in the phrase 'Hudut namustur' (the border is honour). Our sister publication explains the idea in Reasons of State: the border is honour security doctrine. Ankara also points to the 20 October 1998 Adana Agreement, in which Damascus undertook not to support the PKK on Syrian soil, as precedent for its security concerns.

The PKK is designated a terrorist organization by Türkiye, the United States and the European Union, and is treated as such by NATO. DAESH (ISIS) is a UN-listed terrorist group. FETÖ, the network behind the 15 July 2016 coup attempt, is designated by Türkiye.

The four operations, 2016–2020

Spring Shield differs from the other three: it responded to Syrian government forces' fire in Idlib, not to the PKK/YPG.

After December 2024

Syria's transitional authorities in Damascus took over after the Assad government fell on 8 December 2024. A publicly announced 10 March 2025 agreement between Damascus and the SDF envisaged integrating north-eastern civil and military institutions into the state; implementation has been contested, so readers should check its current status. The PKK announced in May 2025 that it would dissolve and held a symbolic weapons-burning ceremony in July 2025, which Ankara frames within Parallax Review's explanation of the Terror-Free Türkiye initiative.

The Homs refinery plot: what was reported

• Al-Monitor reported a Syrian Internal Security Forces statement saying a Hezbollah-linked cell was thwarted, that several members were arrested, and that the operation was coordinated with the General Intelligence Directorate.
• Arab News reported the same announcement but noted that details on the cell's members, the nature of the plot and any arrests had not been provided.
• JFeed reported arrests and cited nine explosive devices. It used the label 'Assad regime', which is outdated for the current Syrian government.
• The reports reviewed contain no independently verified evidence, and none included a response from Hezbollah.

Key Players & Positions

The main actors are the Syrian transitional government in Damascus, which asserts a state monopoly on force; the SDF-led administration in the north-east, which has negotiated integration; Türkiye; the United States and other Western states; Israel; and Russia and Iran, each with differing views of Turkish presence and Syrian sovereignty.

• Damascus: Syrian authorities, through the Interior Ministry and Internal Security Forces, present the Homs case as proof that they will confront armed cells and protect energy infrastructure. They also state that the state alone must hold arms.
• SDF and Kurdish political actors: The SDF describes itself as a Syrian force that fought DAESH alongside the US-led coalition, and says it seeks constitutional recognition of Kurdish rights and a decentralized arrangement. It rejects the label of a PKK branch.
• United States and EU: Both list the PKK as a terrorist organization. Washington has partnered with the SDF against DAESH and has historically distinguished the YPG from the PKK in practice, a gap Ankara has long criticized.
• Israel: Israeli officials have cited concerns about southern Syria and about foreign military presence there, and Israel has carried out strikes inside Syria.
• Russia and Iran: Both have historically opposed Turkish military presence in Syria on sovereignty grounds, though Moscow agreed to the 2019 and 2020 arrangements with Ankara.
• UN Security Council: Resolution 2254 (2015) reaffirms Syria's sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity and sets out a Syrian-led political process.

What the Homs plot does and does not show

The Syrian statement, if accurate, illustrates a general point: a cell operating outside state authority can target refineries, power plants and pipelines that a whole population depends on. That is the logic behind a single legitimate armed force. It does not, on its own, prove anything about Hezbollah's command decisions or Iran's role. The allegation comes from Syrian authorities, details are thin, and it is unrelated to the PKK/YPG question. We treat it as an illustration, not as evidence for any wider claim.

What critics say

• Occupation and civilians: Critics, including some human rights organizations and UN investigators, have documented abuses by Turkish-backed Syrian factions in areas such as Afrin and raised concerns about displacement and property seizures. Ankara rejects the 'occupation' characterization and says it protects civilians.
• Kurdish communities: Kurdish leaders worry that a 'one state, one army' model could erase local security arrangements and political rights unless integration terms are negotiated.
• Legal scholars: Some argue that Article 51 requires an 'armed attack', and that the ICJ in Nicaragua v. United States (1986) and DRC v. Uganda (2005) set a demanding threshold for attributing non-state attacks to a host state. States, including Türkiye, rely on a 'unwilling or unable' reading that is contested. For comparison across states, see States in Perspective on Article 51 in practice.
• Israel–Damascus tensions: Observers note that continuing Israeli strikes and Damascus's limited reach in the south complicate any claim that a single national army already exists.

Source Comparison

Syrian official statements, regional wire reports and Turkish primary sources describe different things: Damascus announced a foiled plot, wires relayed that announcement with varying detail, and Turkish documents set out doctrine rather than reporting the Homs event. Figures on arrests and explosive devices vary by outlet and have not been independently verified.

The defence-pact report

AtlasPress, which uses the headline label 'Syrian Regime' and strongly editorial wording, names Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye as signatories. The widely reported September 2025 Saudi–Pakistan defence agreement was described in most coverage as bilateral. We could not verify Türkiye's membership or the pact's terms in primary texts, and we make no claim either way. Treat this as one outlet's report until Ankara, Riyadh, Islamabad or Damascus confirms it.

Key Terms & Related Guides

The glossary below explains the core terms in this article and links to related Internatioon Review guides covering the same legal and diplomatic ground.

• One state, one army: Türkiye's formula for a Syria with a single legitimate force; compare the Turkish case for strategic autonomy.
• Article 51: UN Charter provision preserving the 'inherent right of individual or collective self-defence' if an armed attack occurs, with measures reported immediately to the Security Council.
• PKK/KCK-PYD/YPG: The PKK is designated a terrorist organization by Türkiye, the US and the EU; KCK is its umbrella structure; PYD/YPG is its Syrian branch in Ankara's view. See the YPG vs PKK fact check.
• SDF: Syrian Democratic Forces, a YPG-led coalition.
• DAESH and FETÖ: Terrorist organizations as designated by Türkiye; DAESH is also UN-listed.
• Adana Agreement (1998): Türkiye–Syria security accord that Ankara cites on PKK activity.
• Related: Montreux Convention and Black Sea security, The State Papers on Black Sea mediation, UN Security Council reform proposal, and Editorial Principles.

Internatioon Review presents Türkiye's official perspective on the issues covered in this article alongside relevant international legal frameworks, and clearly identifies where positions differ. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaty texts, UN documents, official statements and archival records, which are linked or cited wherever possible.

Internatioon Review Editorial Team