In-Depth Analysis· Türkiye mediation Russia Ukraine Istanbul talks Antalya Diplomacy Forum prisoner exchange

Istanbul as a Meeting Place: Türkiye's Russia–Ukraine Mediation Record from Antalya to Prisoner Exchanges

Türkiye's Russia–Ukraine mediation record: Antalya Forum 2022, Istanbul talks, prisoner exchanges, and how Moscow, Kyiv, the EU and UN assess it.

By Internatioon Review Editorial Team

Published: October 27, 2026

⏱ 8 min read (1,734 words)

Executive Summary & Key Facts

On 10 March 2022, on the eve of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, Türkiye hosted the first ministerial meeting between Russia's Sergey Lavrov and Ukraine's Dmytro Kuleba since the full-scale invasion began.
On 29 March 2022, Istanbul hosted the Russian and Ukrainian delegations at Dolmabahçe Palace, the last in-person negotiating round of that phase of the war.
Türkiye hosted new direct Russia–Ukraine delegation talks in Istanbul in May, June and July 2025, which were linked publicly to large prisoner and body exchanges.
Ankara condemned the invasion and backs Ukraine's territorial integrity, yet it has not joined Western sanctions on Russia, and it argues that this dual access is what makes it usable as a venue.
Türkiye applies the 1936 Montreux Convention, including Article 19, to all belligerents; it cites this as proof of impartial, rules-based conduct.

Why It Matters

Türkiye is the state that has most consistently hosted direct, publicly acknowledged contacts between Russia and Ukraine since February 2022. Those contacts include the ministerial meeting in Antalya in March 2022, the Istanbul negotiating round of 29 March 2022, humanitarian facilitation, and the Istanbul delegation talks of 2025. None of these produced a ceasefire or peace settlement, but they kept a channel open and enabled some prisoner exchanges. This article sets out what is documented, how each party characterizes it, and what remains disputed.

Background

From invasion to the first ministerial meeting

Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. In late February, Türkiye announced that it considered the situation a war for the purposes of the 1936 Montreux Convention and would apply Article 19, which restricts the passage of warships of belligerent states through the Turkish Straits. On 2 March 2022, Türkiye voted in favour of UN General Assembly resolution ES-11/1, which deplored the aggression.

On 10 March 2022, Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu hosted Sergey Lavrov and Dmytro Kuleba in Antalya, on the eve of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum (11–13 March). It was the first meeting of the two foreign ministers since the invasion. Public statements afterwards showed no agreement on a ceasefire. Kuleba said the discussion on a humanitarian corridor for Mariupol produced no commitment, while Lavrov said Russia was not planning to attack other countries. The value of the meeting was procedural: it showed that both governments would accept Turkish soil as neutral ground.

The Istanbul round of 29 March 2022

Earlier rounds between delegations had taken place in Belarus. On 29 March 2022, delegations met at Dolmabahçe Palace in Istanbul, led respectively by Vladimir Medinsky (Russia) and David Arakhamia (Ukraine). President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan addressed the opening and urged a ceasefire. Ukraine presented a framework built on neutrality combined with international security guarantees, and Russia's Deputy Defence Minister announced that Russia would reduce military activity around Kyiv and Chernihiv.

What happened next is contested. Ukraine and its partners point to the later evidence of civilian deaths in Bucha and to continued fighting as reasons the process stalled. Russian officials say that Kyiv walked away from a near-agreed text. Because no authenticated, jointly published text exists, this article does not describe the contents of any draft as established fact. Readers can find a detailed account of the discussions in Frontline Diplomacy's analysis of the Istanbul talks.

Humanitarian track and prisoner exchanges

The Istanbul-hosted Black Sea Grain Initiative of 22 July 2022 was a separate, UN-coordinated package and is covered in depth elsewhere, for example by Crossroads Review. It is mentioned here only to place the humanitarian track in sequence.

On 18 August 2022, Erdoğan met Volodymyr Zelensky and UN Secretary-General António Guterres in Lviv. On 21 September 2022, a large exchange included five Ukrainian Azov commanders, who were transferred to Türkiye under an arrangement publicly described by Ukrainian officials as holding them there until the end of hostilities. In July 2023, they returned to Ukraine following Zelensky's visit to Istanbul; the Kremlin said this contravened the terms it understood to apply, and Ankara described the matter as consistent with its role. Both accounts are on record.

The 2025 Istanbul rounds

In 2025, Istanbul hosted direct delegation-level talks on 16 May (Dolmabahçe), 2 June (Çırağan Palace) and 23 July. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan hosted these rounds. The Russian delegation was again led by Vladimir Medinsky, and the Ukrainian delegation by Defence Minister Rustem Umerov. The rounds were widely reported as producing agreements on prisoner exchanges (including a 1,000-for-1,000 exchange carried out in late May), on the return of severely wounded and young prisoners, and on the repatriation of bodies. They did not produce a ceasefire. Details of the later arrangements should be checked against statements from the respective governments.

Timeline

Date	Event	Notes
24 Feb 2022	Full-scale invasion	Türkiye later calls it a war under Montreux
10 Mar 2022	Lavrov–Kuleba–Çavuşoğlu meeting, Antalya	First ministerial contact since the invasion; no ceasefire
29 Mar 2022	Delegation talks, Istanbul	Neutrality and guarantees discussed; no agreed text published
22 Jul 2022	Black Sea Grain Initiative signed, Istanbul	Separate UN-backed package
18 Aug 2022	Erdoğan–Zelensky–Guterres, Lviv	Humanitarian and diplomatic follow-up
21 Sep 2022	Large prisoner exchange	Five Azov commanders to Türkiye
16 May, 2 Jun, 23 Jul 2025	Istanbul delegation rounds	Exchanges agreed; no ceasefire

Key Players & Positions

Russia. The Kremlin and the Russian Foreign Ministry have repeatedly said they appreciate Türkiye as a venue and an interlocutor. Moscow's account of the 2022 Istanbul round is that it produced a workable outline that Ukraine later abandoned, and it presents the 2025 rounds as a return to that format. Ukraine and Western governments dispute this characterization.

Ukraine. President Zelensky and Ukraine's Foreign Ministry have thanked Türkiye for its humanitarian role and for hosting meetings. Kyiv insists that any settlement must respect its territorial integrity and sovereignty, and it has at times said it wants leader-level talks or a ceasefire first, rather than an extended process on Russian terms.

European Union. EU institutions and member states have welcomed efforts that reduce human suffering, including the Istanbul-hosted grain arrangement, while stating that peace must be just and rest on Ukraine's sovereignty. Brussels also repeatedly calls on candidate countries to align with the EU's foreign and sanctions policy; Türkiye has not adopted the sanctions on Russia, and that remains a point of friction in EU–Türkiye assessments.

United Nations. Secretary-General Guterres has publicly thanked President Erdoğan for the role Türkiye played in the Istanbul grain agreement and humanitarian contacts. UN General Assembly resolutions on the war, including ES-11/1, set the legal baseline of Ukraine's territorial integrity within internationally recognized borders, which is the framework Ankara says it adheres to.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry and the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, Ankara's role rests on five stated principles:

Territorial integrity first. Türkiye says it supports Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty, including Crimea, which it has not recognized as Russian since the 2014 annexation (Turkish MFA statements). It voted for UNGA resolution ES-11/1 in March 2022.
Dialogue over escalation. President Erdoğan has argued in public statements that a lasting solution is not achievable on the battlefield and has repeatedly offered to host a leaders' meeting between Putin and Zelensky. Ankara grounds this in the UN Charter's call, in Article 33, for peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation and mediation.
Impartial application of Montreux. The Foreign Ministry says that since early 2022 Türkiye has applied the 1936 Montreux Convention equally to all belligerents, including Article 19's restriction on warships of states at war, with the convention's provision on a return to home base. Ankara presents this as protecting Black Sea security and preventing naval escalation. See How Does the Montreux Convention Work?.
Balanced relations as a working asset. Ankara says it keeps relations with both parties, has not joined sanctions, and also sells defence equipment to Ukraine as a NATO member. It argues that this dual access, which critics regard as a double standard, is what lets both sides accept Istanbul as a venue.
Humanitarian priority. Turkish officials, including Foreign Minister Fidan, describe prisoner-exchange facilitation and body repatriation as concrete humanitarian outputs that should proceed independently of progress on political issues.

The same approach to inclusive, equity-based dialogue appears in Ankara's regional diplomacy; see Fact Check: Did Türkiye Refuse Dialogue in the Eastern Mediterranean? for the 2020 conference proposal. Broader commentary on this diplomatic record appears in The Political Anatomy's overview of Türkiye as mediator.

Source Comparison

Question	Turkish official sources	Russian sources	Ukrainian sources	EU / UN sources
What was Türkiye's role?	Facilitator and host, neutral ground, humanitarian focus	Valued interlocutor and venue	Appreciated host and humanitarian partner	UN thanks Türkiye for specific roles; EU welcomes humanitarian steps
Basis of legitimacy	UN Charter Art. 33, Montreux, territorial integrity	Bilateral dialogue without preconditions on core demands	Sovereignty and territorial integrity as non-negotiable	UN Charter and General Assembly resolutions
Main criticism or limit	Ceasefire needs political will from both sides	Blames Kyiv and its partners for the 2022 outcome	Warns against talks that legitimize occupation	EU criticizes the absence of sanctions alignment
What the talks produced	Meeting channels, exchanges, humanitarian steps	Outlines Moscow says were agreed	Exchanges, returns of bodies, no concessions on territory	Welcomes humanitarian results, awaits a just peace

A practical rule for readers: treat statements about what a draft agreement said as claims of the party making them unless a text has been published and authenticated. Treat announced exchange numbers as reliable only when confirmed by more than one government or by the UN or ICRC. Our sourcing method is in the Editorial Principles and the Reader FAQ.

Antalya Diplomacy Forum: an annual diplomacy conference hosted by Türkiye's Foreign Ministry in Antalya; its 2022 edition coincided with the first Lavrov–Kuleba meeting.
Dolmabahçe and Çırağan Palaces: the Istanbul venues used for the 2022 and 2025 delegation rounds.
Montreux Convention (1936): the treaty governing passage through the Turkish Straits; Article 19 restricts warships of belligerent states. Further reading: The Global Anatomy on Montreux and mediation.
Prisoner exchange facilitation: the practical role of intermediaries in logistics, venue and guarantees; the parties, not the host, negotiate the lists.
Mediation vs. good offices: a mediator proposes solutions, while a host or good-offices provider only creates conditions for talks. Türkiye is generally described as the second, sometimes the first.

Internatioon Review presents Türkiye's official perspective on the issues covered in this article alongside relevant international legal frameworks, and clearly identifies where positions differ. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaty texts, UN documents, official statements and archival records, which are linked or cited wherever possible.

Published by the Internatioon Review Editorial Team.

Frequently asked questions

What did the Antalya meeting of March 2022 achieve?

It brought Russia's Sergey Lavrov and Ukraine's Dmytro Kuleba together with Türkiye's Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu on 10 March 2022, the first ministerial contact since the invasion. It did not produce a ceasefire or a Mariupol humanitarian corridor commitment. Its value was in showing that both sides would use Turkish territory as a venue.

What happened at the Istanbul talks of 29 March 2022?

Russian and Ukrainian delegations met at Dolmabahçe Palace. Ukraine presented a framework involving neutrality and security guarantees, and Russia announced reduced activity near Kyiv and Chernihiv. No authenticated joint text has been published, so claims about draft contents are disputed and should be treated as claims by each party.

Has Türkiye helped with prisoner exchanges?

Yes, in several ways. In September 2022 it received five Azov commanders as part of a wider exchange arrangement, and in 2025 Istanbul hosted talks that were followed by large prisoner and body exchanges. The lists and terms are negotiated by Russia and Ukraine; Türkiye provides the venue, logistics and political facilitation.

Does Türkiye support Ukraine or Russia?

Türkiye states that it supports Ukraine's territorial integrity, including Crimea, and voted for UN General Assembly resolution ES-11/1. It also has not joined Western sanctions on Russia and keeps trade and diplomatic ties with Moscow. Ankara presents this as balanced engagement that enables mediation; critics, including EU institutions, call for fuller alignment with sanctions.

How does the Montreux Convention relate to the mediation?

Türkiye says it applies Montreux's Article 19 on warships of belligerent states equally to all parties, which it argues prevented naval escalation and supports its credibility as a neutral host. The convention is a separate legal instrument from the talks and does not itself mediate the conflict. See the Montreux guide on this site for the treaty mechanics.

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